As stated in the survey \J3T\ by Hosoi and the author, many works have been done during the last decade on the propositional logics between the classical and the intuitionistic (the intermediate propositional logics [[10] that we can use neither Kripke's semantics nor the algebraic one as a uniform way of studying intermediate predicate logics. These incompleteness results present a limitation of semantical methods, but nevertheless there are many problems we can solve now. In this paper we shall prove some basic results on the intermediate predicate logics and their models. We emphasize here that some of them can be easily extended to modal predicate logics and logics stronger than the minimal predicate logics.
We want to study intermediate logics in a general framework, intending to derive some properties common to many intermediate logics, as we mentioned already in Q8j. Semantical methods have played an important role in doing so. But, for the intermediate predicate logics they are found to be incomplete. Indeed, we have shown in Q9] and [[10] that we can use neither Kripke's semantics nor the algebraic one as a uniform way of studying intermediate predicate logics. These incompleteness results present a limitation of semantical methods, but nevertheless there are many problems we can solve now. In this paper we shall prove some basic results on the intermediate predicate logics and their models. We emphasize here that some of them can be easily extended to modal predicate logics and logics stronger than the minimal predicate logics.
We define intermediate predicate logics in § 1. In §2 and §3, two kinds of semantics for them are introduced and some basic properties of them are proved. In §4, we study the cardinality of models and show analogues of Lowenheim theorem. We prove some syntactical results in §5. In §6, we show a certain relationship between predicate logics and propositional logics. We believe that this is a typical example of a general study of logics.
Finally, we would like to stress that without Umezawa's work we could not have any clear insight. §1. Intermediate Predicate Logics First of all, we fix a language 3? in order to define intermediate predicate logics. ££ consists of a list of countably infinite individual variables x, j, z etc. and a list of countably infinite n-ary predicate variables p (n \ q (n \ r w etc. for each non-negative integer n. 0-ary predicate variables are identified with propositional variables. Occasionally, we omit the superscript letter on a predicate variable. 3? contains no constants and no function symbols. The logical symbols of £? are A, V, ->, -i, V and 3 . Formulas (of first order) are defined in the usual way. The letters A, J5, C etc. will denote them. A formula containing neither quantifiers nor predicate variables except propositional variables is called a propositional formula. As we mention below, we identify a logic with the set of formulas provable in it. Thus, by LK (or £/), we mean the set of formulas provable in the pure classical ( Let H be any set of formulas and L be any predicate logic. Then we write L + H for the smallest set of formulas which contains any formula either in L or in H and is closed under modus ponens, the generalization and the substitution. Therefore, if HCLK then L + H is a predicate logic. Similarly, if H is a set of propositional formulas and K is a propositional logic, K+H denotes the smallest set of propositional formulas which contains any formula either in K or in H and is closed under modus ponens and the substitution (of propositional formulas). Sometimes, we write L + Ai~] -----\-A n for L+{Ai,--9 A n }. A predicate logic L is called to be finitely axiomatizable if there is a finite subset H of LK such that L = LJ+H. §2 8 The Algebraic Semantics
In this and the next § §, we shall define two kinds of semantics and study their basic properties. As we deal only with logics and not with theories, we would say structures (or frames) as models, opposing the usual usage of the word model. For instance, as a model of the classical logic, we would take the 2-valued Boolean algebra with a countable domain, not considering a fixed interpretation of each predicate variable. So, as for the algebraic semantics, we get the following definition.
A pseudo-Boolean algebra P is said to be ^-complete for some cardinal /I, if both f\ a and \J a exist in P for any subset S of P such that and ||6|| is the greatest element of P/F-{lp/jr}, where P/jF denotes the quotient algebra of P with respect to F and || || denotes the natural mapping from P to P/F. Define an assignment g of the p.B. model
Since F is finite, we can prove that g-(Fi) = ||a|| = lp/i? and When we study propositional logics, the decomposition theorem plays an important role (see ^3]). We have used its analogue for p.B. models with a finite universe in the above proof. Consider the following proposition (2.7), which means the decomposition theorem for p.B. models. 
Proof. Let
P=i(*> j); o^*<o>, y =o, i}w{(o>, i)} and V={n\ P is ordered by a relation <!* such that , 72) if ^i^^2 and ji^ J 2 -Then P forms a complete pseudo-Boolean algebra with respect to <I*. 
] that the following formula Z^s (which means a distributive law)
is not valid in (P, F). Now suppose that (2.7) holds. Then there exist p.B. models (P,-, F/) (iel) such that Z + (P, V}=f\L 4 -(P i , F/) and each
Pi must be a linear pseudo-Boolean algebra for
This is a contradiction.
On the other hand, we show later that the decomposition theorem for Kripke models holds. §3 0 Kripke's Semantics
We shall discuss Kripke's semantics in the present §. Many of basic properties of Kripke models for propositional logics can be naturally extended.
Definition 3.1. (M, 17) is called a Kripke model if M is a nonempty partially ordered set (with the order <^M) o,nd U is a function from M to the power set of a set S such that 1) if a <J M b then U(a) C U(bl) and 2) U(a) is nonempty for any a EM.
We sometimes omit the subscript M of <^M. A function W is said to be a valuation of a Kripke model (M, U) if it satisfies the following conditions.
Let a and b be arbitrary elements in M. 
Then we say that (M, V") is embeddable into (N, 170.
Theorem 3.4. If (M, U} is embeddable into (N, U'}, then L(M, U}
Corollary 3.5.
Suppose that (M, U) and (N, U') are Kripke models
satisfying the following conditions,
1) there is an embedding of M into N,

2) there is a set S such that U'(b) = S for any b€N and U(a)f
or any a€M.
Then L(M, U)CL(N, IT).
In We shall discuss the cardinality of models in this §. In the definition of Kripke models, the range of the function U is the power set of some set S. Is it necessary to consider the case where 5 is a very large set? A well-known result related to this problem is Lowenheim theorem for the classical predicate logic Q6]. We will prove a kind of Lowenheim theorem for predicate logics characterized by either type of models. 
5.1) if c€5 (B>w) then C(u(B, n, c)) is in ZT, 5.2) otherwise C(u) is in H for any ii6 C/(c Let
V=\JV^ and H H = \J H«>. k<<» k<°>
It is easy to see that each formula in H n is in the language We have dealt with the cardinality of the universe of a model in the above. On the other hand, can we contract the cardinality of a partially ordered set (or a pseudo -Boolean algebra) of a Kripke (or a p.B.) model without changing the logic characterized by it? In the case of prepositional logics, we can show that for any pseudo-Boolean algebra P there exists a pseudo-Boolean algebra Q such that we have only to take P for P'. Now, suppose that P>/1' and /tj>^0-Let H be the set of closed formulas not valid in (P, F). For each formula A in H, we choose an assignment f A such that f A (A) =^= IF-Define a subset 5 of P by n \v 1 ,. ..,v n »;AeH,pW is in X and n,..., *"€ F}.
Let P'=P(S). Then, P 7 is a A-complete subalgebra of P such that P'<> K by Lemma 4.7 and each join or meet of at most A elements of P 
Then we get
Therefore,
where P* is the Lindenbaum algebra of the prepositional logic L + (P).
Of course, P*=^0 = £. This gives our theorem. §5. Some Syntactical Results
In the present §, we shall show two syntactical properties of predicate logics, applying the axiomatic method. These results will be used in the next §.
At first, we remark the following fact. If a formula A is in a predicate logic L+iBi", i£l} then there is a sequence of formulas Ci,---, 
A^ instance of a formula A is defined recursively as follows ; 1) A is an instance of A, 2) if B is an instance of A then any formula obtained from B by using the substitution or the generalization or the alphabetic change of bound or free variables is an instance of A.
It is obvious that if a formula A is in a predicate logic L then any instance of A is in L. The following lemma can be easily verified. (r->s)V-is.
Proof. Let R* 2 = V X(T(X) V (r(*)->s(*)) V ~i *(*)).
Clearly,
R$VDise(LJ+R 2 ')r\(LJ+Dis).
But, we can show that
by using the p.B. model introduced in the proof of Theorem 2.8.
In §6, we shall study a relation between a predicate logic and its prepositional fragment. We prove a theorem which we shall use often in our development in the next §.
Suppose that a formula A is given, a is a function from the set of atomic formulas appearing in A to the set of prepositional variables such We notice here that even if K has the disjunction property (dp) K* does not have dp. (For the definition of the dp, see e.g. £8].) We can
show that many predicate extension of a propositional logic having the dp do not have the dp. It is interesting to see the relation between the dp and the following property;
=(£')*, 
